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Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) is the art of using untrusted devices to
distribute secret keys in an insecure network. It thus represents the ultimate form of cryptography,
offering not only information-theoretic security against channel attacks, but also against attacks
exploiting implementation loopholes. In recent years, much progress has been made towards realising
the first DIQKD experiments, but current proposals are just out of reach of today’s loophole-free
Bell experiments. In this Letter, we close the gap between the theory and practice of DIQKD with a
simple variant of the original protocol based on the celebrated Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
Bell inequality. In using two randomly chosen key generating bases instead of one, we show that
the noise tolerance of DIQKD can be significantly improved. In particular, the extended feasibility
region now covers some of the most recent loophole-free CHSH experiments, hence indicating that
the first realisation of DIQKD already lies within the range of these experiments.
The basic task of DIQKD [1, 2] is to distribute a pair
of identical secret keys between two users, called Alice and
Bob, who are embedded in an untrusted network. To help
them in their task, Alice and Bob are each given a mea-
surement device, which they use to perform random mea-
surements on a sequence of entangled systems provided by
an adversary called Eve (see Fig. 1). The main advantage
of DIQKD is that the measurement devices need not be
characterised—Alice and Bob only need to verify that the
input-output statistics of the devices violate a CHSH Bell
inequality [3, 4]. As such, DIQKD represents the pinna-
cle of cryptography in terms of the number of assumptions
required. More specifically, it only asks that (1) the users
each hold a trusted source of local randomness, (2) their
laboratories are well isolated, (3) they use trusted algo-
rithms for processing their measurement data, and that (4)
quantum theory is correct. Given these basic assumptions
(which are in fact standard assumptions in cryptography),
one can then show that DIQKD is information-theoretically
secure [1, 5, 6].
The practical implementation of DIQKD, however, re-
mains a major scientific challenge. This is mainly due to
the need to have extremely good channel parameters (i.e.,
high Bell violation and low bit error rate), which in practice
requires ultra-low-noise setups with very high detection effi-
ciencies; though in recent years the gap between the theory
and practice has been significantly reduced owing to more
powerful proof techniques [5–7] and the demonstrations of
loophole-free Bell experiments [8–11]. The present gap is
best illustrated by Murta et al. [12], whose feasibility study
showed that current loophole-free Bell experiments are just
short of generating positive key rates assuming the original
DIQKD protocol [1, 2] (see the dashed line in Fig. 3). To
∗ These authors contributed equally to this work.
† charles.lim@nus.edu.sg
Fig. 1. Robust DIQKD: Alice and Bob use uncharacterised
devices to perform measurements on a quantum state that is
created by a source that is potentially controlled by an adversary
(Eve). In the proposed protocol, Alice has two possible inputs
(measurement settings, magenta buttons) which are used for
key generation and for running the CHSH Bell test, and Bob
has four possible inputs grouped into two sets (magenta/cyan
buttons): the magenta buttons are used for key generation while
the cyan buttons are used for running the CHSH Bell test.
improve the robustness of DIQKD, researchers have taken
several approaches, from heralded qubit amplifiers [13, 14],
local Bell tests [15], to two-way classical protocols [16].
However, none of these proposals are truly practical, for
they are either more complex in implementation or provide
only very little improvements in the channel parameters.
Here, we show that a simple variant of the original
DIQKD protocol is enough to obtain significant improve-
ments in the channel parameters. To start with, we note
that in the original protocol introduced by Acín et al. [2],
the key generating basis is predetermined and known to
Eve. For concreteness, let Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
settings be denoted by X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1, 2}, re-
spectively, and let the corresponding outcomes be denoted
by AX ∈ {0, 1} and BY ∈ {0, 1}. The secret key is derived
from the events in which Alice and Bob choose X = 0
and Y = 0, respectively. The remaining measurement
combinations are then used for determining the CHSH vio-
lation. Our DIQKD proposal is essentially the same as the
original protocol, except that we introduce an additional
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Fig. 2. Secret key rate and uncertainty of Eve: (right) Assuming quantum theory, collective attacks, and a given CHSH value
S > 2, we show that our new protocol can establish and certify drastically more uncertainty H(Z|EΘ) (close to the upper physical
limit) than the best approach known before. (left) We consider a noise model (depolarising noise) [1, 2] that only depends on
the CHSH value S. Now a larger amount of noise can be tolerated in order to establish a positive key rate K∞. In detail we can
decrease the critical CHSH value from 2.423 to 2.362. This corresponds to an increase of the critical bit-error-rate from 0.071 to
0.082, which brings a practical implementation of DIQKD into the reach of existing experiments.
measurement setting for Bob and now generate the secret
key from both of Alice’s measurements. This additional
setting is needed so that Bob has a measurement that
is aligned with Alice’s additional key generating basis to
obtain correlated outcomes (like in the case of the original
protocol). Hence in our proposal, the key generation
events are those whereby Alice and Bob choose X = Y = 0
and X = Y = 1. Below, we describe the proposal in detail.
1. Measurements. This step is carried out in N rounds,
where N is assumed to be asymptotically large. In each
measurement round, Alice’s and Bob’s inputs, denoted
by X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, respectively, are
drawn according to the following probability distribu-
tions: P (X = 0) = p, P (X = 1) = 1 − p, P (Y = 0) = qp,
P (Y = 1) = q(1−p) and P (Y = 2) = P (Y = 3) = (1−q)/2,
where 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1. Once Alice and Bob enter their inputs
into their respective devices, they each obtain a mea-
surement outcome, which we denote by AX ∈ {0, 1} and
BY ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
2. Sifting. Alice and Bob announce their measurement
inputs over an authenticated public channel. This allows
them to identify two common subsets of their measurement
data: a pair of raw keys [17] of size ∼ q(p2 + (1 − p)2)N
(corresponding to Y ∈ {0, 1} and X = Y ) and a pair of
parameter estimation data of size ∼ (1− q)N (correspond-
ing to Y ∈ {2, 3}). Alice and Bob discard the remaining
measurement data.
3. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob publicly reveal
their measurement outcomes from the parameter estima-
tion data set and compute the underlying CHSH value:
S = max{2, C12 − C02 − C03 − C13}, (1)
where CXY = P (AX = BY |X,Y ) − P (AX 6= BY |X,Y ) is
the correlation function of X,Y . Alice and Bob proceed
to the next step if S > Stol, where Stol is a predefined
threshold value. Otherwise, they abort the protocol.
4. One-way error correction and verification. In the first
part, Alice computes a syndrome based on her raw key
(denoted by Z1Z2 . . .) and sends it to Bob via the public
channel, who then uses the syndrome and his raw key to
recover Alice’s key. In the second part, they perform an
error verification by comparing the hash values of their raw
keys. Alice and Bob proceed to privacy amplification if the
hash values are identical, otherwise they abort the protocol.
5. Privacy amplification. Alice and Bob perform privacy
amplification to remove Eve’s information about Alice’s
raw key. Once this is completed, Alice and Bob are left
with a pair of identical secret keys.
It is well known that incompatible measurements are nec-
essary for the violation of a Bell inequality and that such
measurements are not jointly measurable and hence cannot
admit a joint distribution [18–20]. The intuition behind our
proposal roughly follows along this line and exploits two re-
lated facts: (1) the key generation measurements of Alice
must be incompatible for S > 2 and (2) Eve has to guess
the secret key from two randomly chosen incompatible mea-
surements.
When the secret key is only generated from a single mea-
surement, like in the original DIQKD protocol, Eve’s at-
tacks are basically limited only by the observed CHSH vi-
olation and thus the monogamy of entanglement [21]. Eve,
however, knows which measurement is used for key genera-
tion and hence can optimise her attack accordingly. On the
other hand, if the secret key is generated from a random
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choice of two possible measurements, Eve faces an addi-
tional difficulty. Namely, in order to achieve a CHSH vi-
olation, the two measurements cannot be the same, and
it is known [1] that for CHSH-based protocols, differ-
ent measurements can give Eve different amounts of side-
information; note that this is not the case for BB84 and
six-state QKD protocols. Therefore, at least one of the
measurements will not be the one that maximises Eve’s
side-information, giving an advantage over protocols based
only on one key-generating measurement (Eve cannot tailor
her attack to the measurement in each round individually,
since she does not know beforehand which measurement
will be chosen).
In the following, we quantify the security of the pro-
tocol using the asymptotic secret key rate, K∞, assum-
ing collective attacks (the generalisation to general attacks
is discussed below). This quantity is the ratio of the ex-
tractable secret key length to the total number of measure-
ment rounds, N , where N → ∞. In the asymptotic limit,
we may also take q → 1, which maximises the so-called
sifting factor and get
K∞ = psr∞,
where ps := p2 +(1−p)2 is the probability of having match-
ing key bases, and r∞ is the secret fraction [17]. The latter
is given in terms of entropic quantities and reads
r∞ :=λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(Z|EΘ)
− λh(QA0B0)− (1− λ)h(QA1B1), (2)
where h(x) := −x log(x)−(1−x) log(1−x) is the binary en-
tropy function, λ := p2/ps, QAXBY := P (AX 6= BY |X,Y )
is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for X,Y , and E is
Eve’s quantum side-information gathered just before the
error correction step. Here, Z = AΘ and Θ ∈ {0, 1} is the
random variable denoting Alice’s basis choice conditioned
on the event either X = Y = 0 or X = Y = 1. The second
line in equation (2) is the amount of information leaked to
Eve during the error correction step (decoding with side-
information Θ).
The main challenge here is to put a reliable lower bound
on the conditional von Neumann entropy H(Z|EΘ), which
measures the amount of uncertainty Eve has about Z given
side-information EΘ, using solely the observed CHSH vi-
olation, S. To this end, we employ a family of device-
independent entropic uncertainty relations [22, 23], which
we can solve efficiently and reliably using a short sequence
of numerical computations. More specifically, we seek to
establish weighted entropic inequalities of the form
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E) ≥ C∗(S),
where C∗(S) is a function of the observed CHSH violation,
S. A proof sketch is outlined in the Methods section and
the complete analysis is provided in the accompanied sup-
plementary information.
A commonly used noise model for benchmarking the se-
curity performance of different QKD protocols is the depo-
larising channel model [1, 2, 17]. In this noise model, all
QBERs are the same and related to the CHSH value S via
QA0B0 = QA1B1 = Q =
1
2
(
1− S
2
√
2
)
.
Using this model, we compute the secret key rate and
H(Z|EΘ), which are presented in Fig. 2. Here, λ is a free
parameter (i.e., a protocol parameter) that can be opti-
mised by Alice and Bob (i.e., they optimise p = P (X = 0))
for a given pair of (S,Q). The result of this optimisa-
tion is remarkably simple: it is optimal to use a protocol
with λ = 1/2 (uniformly random key generation bases) if
S / 2.5( high noise) and set λ = 1, i.e., a fixed key gener-
ation basis otherwise (low noise). Surprisingly, there is no
need to consider the intermediate values of 1/2 < λ < 1.
In the case of the latter, our proposal reverts back to
that of Acín et al. [1, 2] and the computed secret key rate
appears to exactly match their analytical key rate bound.
When using H(Z|EΘ) as a performance metric (which only
depends on S and thus applies to a general class of chan-
nel models satisfying this constraint), we observe that the
uncertainty of Eve for our proposal is always higher than
that of the original protocol for all S ∈ (2, 2√2), see the
right side of Fig. 2. In fact, our proposal is nearly optimal,
in the sense that it is nearly identical to the linear bound,
which is the fundamental upper limit of Eve’s uncertainty
given a fixed S.
In order to evaluate the feasibility of our proposal, we
look at the existing list of loophole-free CHSH experi-
ments [12] and compute the corresponding secret key rates.
Generally speaking, there are two types of Bell experiments:
one based on measuring entangled photon pairs using high
efficiency single-photon detectors and the other based on
event-ready systems [30] using entanglement swapping be-
tween entangled photon pairs and atoms/NV-centres. Fol-
lowing along the lines of Murta et al. [12], we prepare
a feasibility region plot for the list of CHSH experiment
therein, which is presented in Fig. 3. The immediate ob-
servation is that our DIQKD proposal significantly expands
the region of channel parameters that give rise to positive
key rates, thus substantially improving the robustness of
DIQKD. The next observation is that event-ready loophole-
free CHSH experiments [8, 11] are now well within the pos-
itive key region; as opposed to the original protocol where
they are either in the insecure region or around the bound-
ary. Unfortunately, CHSH experiments based on entangled
photon pairs are still in the insecure region, although it
should be mentioned that this observation holds only for
our proposal and the original DIQKD protocol.
While our results clearly indicate that the first realisation
of DIQKD is now well within the grasp of recent event-
ready CHSH experiments, there are still a few potential
issues. For one, we note that these experiments are pretty
slow, e.g., the event-ready experiment by Hensen et al. [8]
performed only 245 rounds of measurement during a total
collection time of 220 h. This has an important implication
on the finite-key analysis of DIQKD as it has been esti-
mated that at least 106 measurement rounds are needed to
achieve positive keys [12]. Recently, Humphreys et al. [31]
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label experiment year rate [bit]
(1) Matsukevich et al. [24] 2008 0.004
(2) Pironio et al., [25] 2010 0.118
(3) Giustina et al. [26] 2013 0
(4) Christensen et al. [27] 2013 0
(5) Giustina et al. [9] 2015 0
(6) Shalm et al. [10] 2015 0
(7) Hensen et al. [8] 2015 0.057
(8) Rosenfeld et al. [11] 2017 0.019
Fig. 3. Achievable rates for existing experiments: The con-
tour plot to the left illustrates the keyrate K∞ = psr∞ as a func-
tion of S and QBER. We marked the location of eight recent
experiments (data from Murta et al. [12], Tab. 4). The experi-
ments (1-4) (marked in grey) are not loophole-free. The dashed
line marks the boundary of the previously known [1, 2] zero-key-
rate region. Our DIQKD proposal suggests that now a positive
key rate with relevant magnitude is possible for all non-photonic
experiments ((1,2) and (7,8)). However, note that the value of
QBER for experiment (8) provided by Murta et al. [12] is based
on the experiment of Henkel et al. [28] while the QBER achievable
by experiment (8) is estimated to be higher [29].
demonstrated that it is possible to improve the entangle-
ment rate by couple of orders of magnitude, but this comes
at the expense of the overall state fidelity and hence lower
CHSH violations. While this is a predicament for the orig-
inal DIQKD protocol, our proposal with increased robust-
ness could enable some of these faster event-ready experi-
ments to achieve positive keys with lower CHSH violations
in the finite-key regime.
The above also brings us to the study of finite-size effects
of our DIQKD proposal. In our security analysis, we made
the assumption of collective attacks and provided a concise
numerical method to reliably lower bound H(Z|EΘ), the
von Neumann entropy of Z given EΘ. We argue that there
is likely no loss of generality in taking this approach, as it
may be possible to extend the results to general attacks in
the finite-key regime using the entropy accumulation the-
orem [32–34]. This was indeed the case for the original
DIQKD protocol, where the collective attack analysis has
been extended to general attacks in the finite-key regime
[6]. We thus leave the finite-key analysis of our proposal
(with a detailed modelling of event-ready Bell experiment)
for future work.
To further improve the robustness of DIQKD, there are
a few possible directions to take. For one, we can consider
the full input-output probability distribution instead of just
taking the CHSH violation, which only looks at part of the
available information. This suggests that the secret key
rates presented in Fig. 3 could be further improved by using
the full probability distribution. More secrecy could be
certified if one finds a method to compute secret key rates
which factors into account the full probability distribution
estimated from the experiment. A method for doing so was
recently developed [35]; however, we found that the bounds
it gives in this scenario (see supplementary information) do
not outperform those shown above.
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METHODS
Here, we outline the main ideas of our security analysis.
The core of the security analysis is a reliable lower-bound
estimate on the conditional von Neumann entropy of Eve.
The complete analysis is deferred to the accompanying sup-
plementary information.
Average secret key rate
Conditioned on the key generation rounds, Alice and Bob
would pick their inputs (basis choices) according to a proba-
bility distribution (p, 1−p). As discussed in the main text,
this distribution acts as a free parameter in our protocol
and has to be adapted to a given set of channel parame-
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ters (S,Q) in order to obtain an optimal performance. In
the following we will therefore outline how the final key
rate K∞ and secret fraction r∞ are given as functions of
(p, S,Q).
The secret fraction in a round of the protocol, in which
the measurements AX and BY are obtained, can be com-
puted using the Devetak-Winter bound [36] under the as-
sumption of collective attacks,
rAXBY∞ ≥ H(AX |E)−H(AX |BY ). (3)
Here the term H(AX |BY ) only depends on the statistics of
the measured data of Alice and Bob, and can therefore be
directly estimated in an experiment. For binary measure-
ments this quantity can be furthermore expressed by the
respective bit error rate QAXBY via
H(AX |BY ) ≤ h(QAXBY ). (4)
In our protocol, a key generation round is obtained when-
ever Alice and Bob perform measurements AX and BY with
X = Y . The probability that Alice and Bob perform the
measurements A0 and B0 is p2 and the probability that
they perform A1 and B1 is (1 − p)2. When the error cor-
rection is done for both cases, (A0, B0) or (A1, B1), sepa-
rately, we obtain the overall asymptotic key rate as sum of
the individual secret fractions weighted by their respective
probability. This gives
K∞ ≥ p2rA0B0∞ + (1− p)2rA1B1∞
= p2H(A0|E) + (1− p)2H(A1|E)
− p2H(A0|B0)− (1− p)2H(A1|B1)
≥ ps
(
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E)
− λh(QA0B0)− (1− λ)h(QA1B1)
)
:= psr∞, (5)
where the success probability ps and the relative distribu-
tion of the basis choices (λ, (1− λ)) are given by
ps =
(
p2 + (1− p)2) = 1− 2p+ 2p2 (6)
and
λ =
p2
1− 2p+ 2p2 , (7)
respectively. As mentioned in the main text we also write
H(Z|EΘ) := λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E) (8)
where Θ denotes a binary random variable (distributed by
(λ, (1 − λ))) that (virtually) determines which basis pair,
(A0, B0) or (A1, B1), is picked in a successful key generation
round in order to generate the values of a combined random
variable Z = AΘ.
Device independent entropic uncertainty relation
The only term in the key rate formula (5) that cannot be
directly obtained from the measurement data is the condi-
tional entropy H(Z|EΘ). The main challenge here is thus
to establish a reliable lower bound on this quantity assum-
ing only the CHSH violation S. More specifically, we are
interested in finding a function C∗(S) such that
H(Z|EΘ) ≥ C∗(S) (9)
holds for all possible combinations of states and measure-
ments (in any dimension) that are consistent with the ob-
served CHSH value S. An inequality like equation (9)
is commonly referred to as an entropic uncertainty rela-
tion, and in our case, we are interested in relations with
quantum side-information [22, 37, 38]. There is a vast
amount of literature [23, 39, 40] in which relations of this
form [22, 37, 38, 41] or similar [42–48] have been studied
and several types of uncertainty relations have been dis-
covered. A typical family of entropic uncertainty relation,
which is close to our problem, is that proposed by Berta
et al. [22] and the weighted generalisation of it from Gao
et al. [38]. These inequalities, however, are not device-
independent and requires the measurement characterisa-
tion of at least one party, which unfortunately is not pos-
sible in our setting.
To the best of our knowledge, the only known entropic
uncertainty relations for uncharacterised measurements are
given by Tomamichel et al. [49] and Lim et al. [15]. There,
the uncertainty of the measurement outcomes with side-
information is lower bounded by the so-called overlap of
the measurements [22], which in turn is further bounded
by a function of the CHSH violation. Although these rela-
tions are applicable to uncharacterised measurements, they
appear fairly weak when applied to our DIQKD proposal,
i.e., they do not provide any improvement in the secret key
rate when compared to the original protocol.
The lower bound we establish in this work, i.e., the func-
tion C∗(S), appears to be optimal, in that it can be sat-
urated by two-qubit states up to numerical precision (see
Supplementary Information). C∗(S) is depicted in the right
side of Fig. 2 for λ = 0.5, and in the right side of Fig. 4 for
continuous values of λ and S ∈ {2, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 2.8, 2√2}.
On the left side of Fig. 4, we additionally plotted the so-
called uncertainty sets [40, 47, 50] of our relation. These
are sets that outline all the admissible pairs of entropies
(H(A0|E), H(A1|E)) for a given lower bound on S. We
also note that it may seem plausible to independently opti-
mise each term H(A0|E), H(A1|E), instead of the sum of
them. However, as shown on the right side of Fig. 4, nu-
merical results suggest that optimising the weighted sum
of these terms is always better than optimising the individ-
ual term: this also highlights where our DIQKD proposal
improves over the original protocol.
Computing C∗(S)
As mentioned, the complete analysis of our lower bound
on C∗(S) is deferred to the Supplementary Information.
In the following we will only outline the main steps of the
analysis to reduce the computation of C∗(S) to a sequence
of problems that can be treated successively. The basic
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Fig. 4. Device-independent uncertainty relations: On the left side, the plot shows the device-independent uncertainty relation
between λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E), where the solid line is the fundamental uncertainty C∗(S) for a given CHSH violation. The
shaded region above the line hence represents the feasible region of (H(A0|E), H(A1|E)) given S. Evidently, when S = 2
√
2, we
see that H(A0|E) = H(A1|E) = 1 must be maximally random; indeed, S = 2
√
2 corresponds to the case where Eve is completely
uncorrelated with the devices and hence her best guess is limited to a random guess. On the right side figure, the plot shows the
minimal uncertainty C∗(S) (the bottom dashed line) attained when λ = 0, 1 and one can see that C∗(S) (solid line) for 0 < λ < 1
always gives a non-trivial advantage over the limiting case (like in the original DIQKD protocol).
idea to find a way to compute C∗(S) by only using known
estimates (both analytical and numerical) that give a final
lower bound that is reliable. This means that all the steps
of the analysis assumes the worst-case scenario, so that final
value is a strict lower bound on C∗(S). In brief, the analysis
uses a refined version of Pinsker’s inequality, semi-definite
optimisation and an ε-net to achieve this goal.
Our first step is to reformulate the tripartite problem in-
volving Alice, Bob and Eve to a bipartite one that involves
only Alice and Bob. Following Ref. [51], we note that con-
ditional entropy terms like H(A0|E) can always be refor-
mulated as the entropy production H(TX(ρAB))−H(ρAB)
of the quantum channel TX on a complementary system
(the post measurement state on the Alice-Bob system). In
our case, this channel TX is a pinching channel, which sat-
isfies TX = T 2X = T
∗
X and acts complementary to the map
that models Alice’s measurement. With this, we can fur-
ther rewrite the entropy production as
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E)
= λH(T0[ρAB ])− λH(ρAB)
+ (1− λ)H(T1[ρAB ])− (1− λ)H(ρAB)
= λD(ρAB‖T0[ρAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρAB‖T1[ρAB ]), (10)
where D(ρ‖σ) is the quantum relative entropy of ρ with
respect to σ.
Then, we follow a proof technique in Ref. [1, 2] to re-
duce the underlying ρAB to a mixture of two-qubit states,
where it is assumed that the mixing is due to Eve. That
is, since each party (Alice and Bob) only perform two bi-
nary measurements, their local measurement devices can be
described by only specifying two projectors (whose dimen-
sions are unspecified). The corresponding local algebras,
which are generated by two projectors, are well investigated
mathematical objects [52] for which a central theorem [53]
states that their representation can be decomposed into
2 × 2 (qubit) blocks and a commuting rest. Correspond-
ingly, this allows us to conclude (details in the Supplemen-
tary Information) that desired uncertainty bound can be
decomposed accordingly as a convex combination:
C∗(S) ≥ inf
µ
∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)C∗C4×4(S
′) (11)
s.th.: µ([2, 2
√
2]) ≤ 1, µ ≥ 0∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)S′ = S,
where C∗C4×4(S
′) is a lower bound on the conditional en-
tropyH(Z|EΘ) for projective measurements on two qubits.
Here, we note that once a bound on C∗C4×4(S
′) is estab-
lished, the optimisation over all measures µ, which can
be geometrically interpreted as taking a convex hull, is
straightforward to perform. As shown in Fig. 5, the sit-
uation for the optimisation corresponding to C∗C4×4(S
′) can
now, w.l.o.g., be fully described by specifying a two-qubit
state and two angles (ϕ, ω) that describe the relative align-
ment of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements.
Although the problem has been reduced to two-qubit
states and projective qubit measurements, a direct compu-
tation of C∗C4×4(S
′) is still an open problem as there are no
known proof techniques can be applied to our situation. To
that end, we employ a refined version of Pinsker’s inequal-
ity (see Theorem 1 in the Supplementary Information),
D(ρ‖T [ρ]) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1
2
− 1
2
‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1
)
, (12)
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Fig. 5. Measurement setting for two-qubit states: Alice
has two projective measurement that are described by projectors
(ΠA00 ,Π
A0
1 ) and (Π
A1
0 ,Π
A1
1 ) with relative angle ϕ. Bob has in
total four measurements: for key generation, ideally he should
perform measurements B0 and B1 which are aligned with Al-
ice’s measurements A0 and A1 to minimise the quantum bit
error rates. The security analysis only depends on Bob’s mea-
surements B2 and B3, which are w.l.o.g. specified by a relative
angle ω.
to obtain a lower bound on the relative entropy in (10) in
terms of trace norm.
The big advantage of establishing estimates in terms of
trace norm is that a minimisation of trace norm can be
formulated as semi-definite program (SDP).
With that, the overall optimisation problem at hand now
reads
inf
ϕ∈[0,pi/2]
inf
b
‖b‖2=1
infρ λδ (ρ, 0) + (1− λ)δ (ρ, ϕ)
s.th.: 〈F0 + F · b〉ρ = S
(13)
where
δ (ρ, ϕ) :=
∥∥∥{ρ,Q(ϕ)}− 2Q(ϕ)ρQ(ϕ)∥∥∥
1
(14)
and constraints that are linear in ρ given by 4× 4-matrices
F0 and F · b = bxFx(ϕ) + bzFz(ϕ), (15)
where Q(ϕ), Fx(ϕ) and Fy(ϕ) depend on ϕ in terms of the
first and second order in cos(ϕ) and sin(ϕ). In the above
b is a vector on a (2-norm) unit sphere that arises from
reformulating the description of Bob’s measurements.
This optimisation can be solved in three stages: indicated
by boxes in (13).
(i) The black box is an SDP on 4×4 matrices, which can
be efficiently solved [54].
(ii) The optimisation in the second box (magenta box)
is performed by relaxing the continuous optimisation
over the (2-norm) unit sphere to a discrete optimisa-
tion on a sequence of polygonial approximation (sim-
ilar to the method used in Schwonnek et al. [55, 56]).
Also this optimisation can be performed with reliable
lower bounds to the order of any target precision.
(iii) The last optimisation in the biggest box (cyan box)
only runs over the single parameter ϕ coming from a
bounded domain. Hence, it is possible to efficiently
tackle this optimisation by an ε-net. In order to do
so it is required to provide an error estimate (for the
magenta and the black box) for all ϕ that are located
in ε interval around some ϕ0. Note that all previous
optimisations are linear in ρ and b and only depend
in the second order on cos(ϕ) and sin(ϕ) (which are
bounded functions of ϕ).
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I. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section documents the derivation of our lower bound on the quantity C∗(S), which is introduced in the main text.
C∗(S) is defined as the minimum H(Z|EΘ) (conditional entropy of Z given side-information EΘ) upon observing a CHSH
value of S. Recall that
H(Z|EΘ) := λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E) (1)
describes Eve’s uncertainty about the measurement outcome Z given Θ and is a keystone for determining the secret key
rate of our device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) protocols.
Before diving into the derivation, we will furnish the definitions and notations of the quantum states, operators and
functionals that will be used throughout this section. In the main text, we considered a Bell scenario where two parties
Alice and Bob input measurement settings X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} respectively into their devices and in return,
each device outputs a bit. We shall omit the measurement settings Y = 0, 1 for the entirety of this section as they do not
serve any role in the estimation of H(Z|EΘ).
Since we are working in a fully device-independent setting, we can assume that all measurements can be written as
projectors without any loss of generality (refer to the explanation in [1]). As such, we denote the projectors corresponding
to measurements A0, A1, B2, B3 as
A0 = {ΠA00 ,ΠA01 }, A1 = {ΠA10 ,ΠA11 }, B2 = {ΠB20 ,ΠB21 }, and B3 = {ΠB30 ,ΠB31 }, (2)
where the subscript of each projector denotes its corresponding measurement outcome. Therefore, the correlation mea-
surement operators are defined by
CA0 := ΠA00 −ΠA01 , CA1 := ΠA10 −ΠA11 , CB2 := ΠB20 −ΠB21 , and CB3 := ΠB30 −ΠB31 . (3)
The correlation measurement operators and the correlation function CXY = P (AX = BY |X,Y ) − P (AX 6= BY |X,Y )
defined in the main text is related via CXY = tr
(
ρ CAX ⊗ CBY ) where ρ is the measured quantum state. Hence, the
CHSH operator is denoted as
CHSH := CA1 ⊗ CB2 − CA0 ⊗ CB2 − CA0 ⊗ CB3 − CA1 ⊗ CB3 . (4)
Furthermore, we denote the single round quantum state of Alice and Bob by ρAB and assume that Eve holds the purification
of this state. Thus, the joint state describing Alice, Bob, and Eve quantum systems is given by some pure state ψABE ,
whose Hilbert space dimension is unknown. Conventionally, the von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ is denoted
and defined by H(ρ) := − tr(ρ log ρ), we shall adopt the shorthand notation of
H(AB) = H(ρAB), H(B) = H(ρB), H(E) = H(ρE) . . . (5)
to denote the entropy of a specific subsystem, whenever the underlying state is clear from the context. Next, a classical-
quantum state after the action of Alice’s measurement, AX , is modelled by
ρAXBE =
∑
i∈{0,1}
|i〉〈i| ⊗ trA
(
(ΠAXi ⊗ 1BE)ψABE(ΠAXi ⊗ 1BE)
)
, (6)
∗ These authors contributed equally to this work.
where |i〉〈i| indexes a classical register that stores the measurement outcomes. Thus, the conditional entropy H(AX |E) =
H(AXE)−H(E) is well-defined for any given joint quantum state describing Alice, Bob and Eve’s systems through the
above-mentioned relations.
Finally, we could state the proper mathematical definition of C∗(S) using the furnished definitions:
C∗(S) = inf
A0,A1,B2,B3
inf
ψABE
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E)
s.th.: 〈CHSH〉ρAB = S. (7)
In the following subsections, we will provide the detailed derivation of our lower bound on the quantity C∗(S) and the
structure of the proceedings are organised as follows:
IA We start by following a well-known argument [1–3], which allows us to reformulate the estimation of conditional
entropy of Eve in a tripartite scenario into the estimation of entropy production on the Alice-Bob system.
I B We proceed by following the argument of Pironio et al.[4], which allows us to conclude that the worst case, i.e. the
optimal attack of Eve, can always be realised by Alice and Bob performing a convex combination of projective
measurements on a two qubit state. Even though the problem now may seem straightforward, it still requires the
application of a suite of non-trivial numerical and analytical methods. This is due to the fact that the simultaneous
optimisation over states and measurements is neither linear nor convex.
I C We then apply a new refined version of Pinsker’s inequality (see Thm. 1) that enables the estimation of entropies
via certain trace norms. The remaining problem of optimising over trace norms can then be bounded using an
efficient algorithm, which will be introduced in the follow subsections.
ID We first formulate the optimisation over the unknown quantum state as a semi-definite program (SDP).
I E Although the optimisation over Bob’s measurements is not convex, we formulated an efficient algorithm that
lower bounds this optimisation up to arbitrary precision.
I F At this stage, it only remains to optimise over Alice’s measurements. Similar to the previous subsection,
optimising over Alice’s measurements also result in a non-convex optimisation problem. Since this optimisation only
involves a single parameter, which is the angle ϕ between Alice’s measurements, we could simply employ an adaptive
refining ε-net. This is possible as all operators involved in the previous steps can be explicitly bounded in norm.
IG At this point we are able to compute reliable and arbitrarily tight lower bounds on C∗(S) for any two-qubit strategy.
Using IB, we are able to compute the final C∗(S) for a raster of different Bell violations S on qubits and taking its
convex hull subsequently.
A. Reduction to locally accessible quantities
The defining advantage of quantum over classical cryptography stems from the fact that for a quantum system it is
possible to witness the action of Eve, given only access to the Alice-Bob subsystem. In this subsection, we will relate
the conditional entropy H(AX |E), which depends on Eve’s system, to quantities that only depends on Alice and Bob’s
systems. Such effort will allow us to circumvent the obstacle of having to perform optimisation over Eve’s quantum system
with unbounded Hilbert space dimension.
We begin by viewing any key generating measurement, AX , of the DIQKD protocol from the perspective of a larger
Hilbert space (similarly to the appendix of [2]) by introducing a classical memory AX that is used to store the measurement
outcome. We denote AinitX as the abelian algebra describing the initial (empty) state of the memory and φ as its associated
pure quantum state. As such, the process of measuring AX on Alice’s quantum system (modelled by von Neumann algebra
A) and recording the outcome into the memory can be described by a unitary evolution that transforms the pure initial
state ΨABE ⊗ φ into a final state ΨA′BEAX . Note that the unitary evolution also involves the transformation of A into
the post measurement state of a system A′. Hence, H(AX |E) can be understood as entropy production ∆H on the
memory-Eve system.
From the dilated perspective (see Fig. 1), the memory-Eve system is only one side of a bipartition, where the Alice-Bob
system is the other. Since the local von Neumann entropies on two sides of a bipartite pure state are equal (see Thm.2(c)
of [5]), the entropy production on the Alice-Bob system is equal to the entropy production of the memory-Eve system.
Consequently, we can conclude that
H(AX |E) = H(AXE)−H(E) = H(AXE)−H(AinitX E) (8)
= H(A′B)−H(AB) := ∆H (9)
2
Fig. 1. The Stinespring dilated perspective: A key generating mea-
surement AX is regarded from the perspective of a higher Hilbert space
by including the action AX → AinitX on a classical memory (an abelian
algebra). From this perspective the global state before and after the
measurement is pure. In this case, due to the Araki-Lieb inequality (see
Thm.2(c) of [5]), the entropy production ∆H = H(AX |E) on the Eve-
Memory partition equals the entropy change on the Alice-Bob partition.
This allows us to bound H(AX |E) by measuring only on the Alice-Bob
partition, i.e. without accessing Eve’s system.
Therefore, we could restrict the values of H(AX |E) by only considering the transformation AB → A′B. A short calculation
(see [1–3]) shows that this transformation is described by the pinching channels, defined by
T0[ρ] : = (Π
A0
0 ⊗ 1) ρ (ΠA00 ⊗ 1) + (ΠA01 ⊗ 1) ρ (ΠA01 ⊗ 1)
T1[ρ] : = (Π
A1
0 ⊗ 1) ρ (ΠA10 ⊗ 1) + (ΠA11 ⊗ 1) ρ (ΠA11 ⊗ 1).
(10)
Following the definitions of the pinching channels, we have the identities T [ρ] = T ◦ T [ρ] = T ∗[ρ] and also f(T [ρ]) =
T [f(T [ρ])] when used within a functional calculus for a measurable function f . Hence, we can conclude that:
H(T [ρ])−H(ρ) = − tr(T [ρ] log(T [ρ])) + tr(ρ log(ρ))
= − tr(ρT ∗[log(T [ρ])]) + tr(ρ log(ρ))
= − tr(ρ log(T [ρ])) + tr(ρ log(ρ))
= D(ρ‖T [ρ]), (11)
where D(ρ‖σ) denotes the relative entropy. Therefore, we can rewrite the convex mixture of conditional entropies as
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E)
= λH(T0[ρAB ])− λH(ρAB) + (1− λ)H(T1[ρAB ])− (1− λ)H(ρAB)
= λD(ρAB‖T0[ρAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρAB‖T1[ρAB ]) (12)
Thus, we are able to bound Eve’s conditional uncertainty on the measurement outcomes from any convex mixture of
measurement bases by estimating the entropy production on the Alice-Bob system.
B. Restriction to qubits
In this subsection, we will show that for the purpose of bounding C∗(S), we could without loss of generality consider
Alice-Bob system as a convex combination of two-qubits states.
A fundamental theorem on the algebra generated by a pair of two projections [6–9], which will be in our case (ΠA00 ,Π
A1
0 )
such as (ΠB20 ,Π
B3
0 ), states that we can always find a representation of the respective system of Alice and Bob that allows
us to decompose the projectors into 2× 2 blocks and a commuting rest.
In particular, let KA, LA,KB and LB be pairwise commuting projectors and let
Q(θ) =
(
cos(θ/2)2 cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2) sin(θ/2)2
)
(13)
be a family of 2× 2 projectors. Then, we can decompose
ΠA00 =
⊕
j
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊕KA and ΠA10 =
⊕
j
Q(ϕj)⊕ LA (14)
3
ΠB20 =
⊕
l
(
1 0
0 0
)
⊕KB and ΠB30 =
⊕
l
Q(ωl)⊕ LB (15)
where {ϕj} and {ωl} are families of angles that can be obtained from the spectra of σ(ΠA00 + ΠA10 ) and σ(ΠB20 + ΠB30 )
respectively (see [9] for details). The representations of the remaining projectors ΠA01 ,Π
A1
1 ,Π
B2
1 and Π
B3
1 follow from the
identities
ΠAX1 = 1−ΠAX0 and ΠBY1 = 1−ΠBY0 . (16)
Furthermore, we can also always find channels TAblock, T
B
block and T
AB
block := T
A
block⊗TBblock that diagonalise the entire systems
of Alice and Bob into the corresponding blocks of (14) and (15). Applying these channels on an arbitrary state ρAB will
therefore give us a corresponding decomposition
TABblock[ρAB ] =
⊕
jl
µjlρ
jl ⊕ µrestσrest, (17)
where σrest denotes the projection of ρAB into blocks that are commuting on either Alice’s and/or Bob’s side while the
coefficients µjl can be obtained by renormalising TABblock[ρAB ] blockwise (see [4]). As the pinching channels T0 and T1
commute with TABblock by construction and by using data processing, we can estimate
λD(ρAB‖T0[ρAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρAB‖T1[ρAB ])
≥ λD(TABblock[ρAB ]‖T0 ◦ TABblock[ρAB ]) + (1− λ)D(TABblock[ρAB ]‖T1 ◦ TABblock[ρAB ]))
=
∑
jl
µil
(
λD(ρjlAB‖T0[ρjlAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρjlAB‖T1[ρjlAB ])
)
+ µrest (λD(σrest‖T0[σrest]) + (1− λ)D(σrest‖T1[σrest])) .
(18)
Relating back to the constraint of optimisation (7), we have CHSH = TABblock[CHSH] which implies
tr (ρABCHSH) = S ⇔ tr
(
ρjlABCHSH
)
= Sjl and
∑
jl
µjlS
jl = S, (19)
where we already took into account that σrest will not play any role in the following optimisation as | tr(σrestCHSH)| ≤ 2
since the corresponding blocks commute on at least one side. Using the above relations, we can optimise every ρjlAB
individually and reformulate (7) as
C∗(S) = inf
A0,A1,B2,B3
inf
{µjl}∑
jl µjl≤1
inf
{Sjl}∑
jl µjlS
jl=S
∑
jl
µjl
infρjl λD(ρ
jl
AB‖T0[ρjlAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρjlAB‖T1[ρjlAB ])
s.th.: 〈CHSH〉ρjlAB = S
jl
(20)
In the above we lower bound infρjl [. . . ] by the function
C∗C4×4(s) = infϕ,ω
infρjl λD(ρ
jl
AB‖T0[ρjlAB ]) + (1− λ)D(ρjlAB‖T1[ρjlAB ])
s.th.: 〈CHSH〉ρjlAB = S
(21)
Since (21) is by construction independent of the specific angles of the underlying measurements A0, A1, B2, B3, we can
reduce the optimisation over all measurements A0, A1, B2, B3 to an optimisation over all possible {µjl}. Hence we can
conclude the bound
C∗(s) ≥ inf
A0,A1,B2,B3
inf
{µjl}∑
jl µjl≤1
inf
{Sjl}∑
jl µjlS
jl=S
∑
jl
µjl C
∗
C4×4(S
jl)
≥ inf
µ
∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)C∗C4×4(S
′)
s.th.: µ([2, 2
√
2]) ≤ 1, µ ≥ 0,
∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)S′ = S, (22)
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by estimating the optimisation over all {µjl} of arbitrary length via an integral over a positive sub-normalised measure
µ. The boundaries of the above integration originate from the simple observation that S can not be larger than 2
√
2 and
that C∗C4×4(S
jl) = 0 for all S ≤ 2, which in fact also gives us the justification to ignore the σrest contribution in (18).
At this point, we can write down an explicit matrix representation of the CHSH operator. For reasons that will be clear
in the following steps, it is convenient to decompose the CHSH operator with respect to Bob measurements as
CHSH = F0 + bxFx + bzFz (23)
with
bx = sin(ω) bz = cos(ω)
F0 =
 cos(ϕ)− 1 0 − sin(ϕ) 00 1− cos(ϕ) 0 sin(ϕ)− sin(ϕ) 0 1− cos(ϕ) 0
0 sin(ϕ) 0 cos(ϕ)− 1

Fx =

0 2 cos2
(
ϕ
2
)
0 − sin(ϕ)
2 cos2
(
ϕ
2
)
0 − sin(ϕ) 0
0 − sin(ϕ) 0 −2 cos2 (ϕ2 )− sin(ϕ) 0 −2 cos2 (ϕ2 ) 0

Fz =
 − cos(ϕ)− 1 0 sin(ϕ) 00 cos(ϕ) + 1 0 − sin(ϕ)sin(ϕ) 0 cos(ϕ) + 1 0
0 − sin(ϕ) 0 − cos(ϕ)− 1
 (24)
and reformulate the optimisation over Bob’s angle ω as an optimisation over two parameters bx, bz fulfilling the constraint
b2x + b
2
z = 1. Hence our optimisation problem for a single two-qubit state reads
C∗C4×4(S) := inf
ϕ∈[0,pi/2]
inf
(bx,bz)
b2x+b
2
z=1
infρ λD(ρ‖T0[ρ]) + (1− λ)D(ρ‖T1[ρ])
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
, (25)
where we will, with a slight abuse of notation, denote the pinching channels for the reduced 2 × 2 measurements as T0
and T1 as well.
C. Estimating the relative entropy via the trace norm (Pinsker++)
In this subsection, we will show that a lower bound of C∗C4×4(S) is related to an optimisation with its objective function
given by a combination of trace norms. As such, this optimisation can be efficiently bounded as shown in the following
subsections. Here, we employ a refined version of Pinsker’s inequality provided in Theorem 1 (also see [10]): for a pinching
channel with two-outcomes we can lower bound the relative entropy between its input and output by their trace norm via
D(ρ‖TX [ρ]) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1
2
− 1
2
‖ρ− TX [ρ]‖1
)
, (26)
where h2(p) = −p log p − (1 − p) log(1 − p) denotes the binary entropy function. Using the above inequality and the
concavity of the binary entropy, we could write
λD(ρ‖T0[ρ]) + (1− λ)D(ρ‖T1[ρ]) (27)
≥ log(2)− λh2
(
1
2
− 1
2
‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1
)
− (1− λ)h2
(
1
2
− 1
2
‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
)
≥ log(2)− h2
(
1
2
− 1
2
(
λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
))
which is a monotonous function of the sum of the trace norms. Hence, we can employ the inequality
C∗C4×4(S) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1
2
− 1
2
t
)
(28)
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for any t ≤ t∗(S) that gives a lower bound on the optimisation
t∗(S) := inf
ϕ∈[0,pi/2]
inf
(bx,bz)
b2x+b
2
z=1
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
(29)
The boxes in (29) highlight different stages in the optimisation that will be addressed individually in the following three
subsections.
D. Optimisation of ρ for fixed angles: reformulation as SDP
In this subsection, we will formulate the minimisation over ρ (black box in (29)) as a SDP, which can be solved using
existing numerical algorithms. To this end, we will use a well-known relation that the trace norm of a quadratic matrix
V can be represented by the minimisation (refer to [11])
‖V ‖1 = inf
K,L
1
2
tr(K + L) s.th.:
(
K V
V † L
)
≥ 0. (30)
over additional matrices K and L. We can explicitly expand the channels TX in terms of the measurement projectors,
which can be written as
ρ− T1(ρ) = ρQ(ϕ) +Q(ϕ)ρ− 2Q(ϕ)ρQ(ϕ) and ρ− T0(ρ) = ρQ(0) +Q(0)ρ− 2Q(0)ρQ(0). (31)
Hence, we can rewrite the minimisation over ρ as the following SDP:
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
(32)
= inf
ρ
K0,L0,K1,L1
λ tr(K0 + L0) + (1− λ) tr(K1 + L1)
s.th.:
(
K0 ρQ(0) +Q(0)ρ− 2Q(0)ρQ(0)
ρQ(0) +Q(0)ρ− 2Q(0)ρQ(0) L0
)
≥ 0
(
K1 ρQ(ϕ) +Q(ϕ)ρ− 2Q(ϕ)ρQ(ϕ)
ρQ(ϕ) +Q(ϕ)ρ− 2Q(ϕ)ρQ(ϕ) L1
)
≥ 0
tr (ρ(F0 + bxFx + bzFz)) = S. (33)
E. Optimisation of Bob’s angle: an outer approximation to bx, bz
The minimisation over Bob’s measurement angle (the magenta box in (29)) was formulated as an optimisation over
parameters (bx, bz) from a set
K = {(bx, bz)|b2x + b2z = 1}, (34)
6
which can be interpreted as boundary of a circle with unit radius. Since the objective function of (29) does not explicitly
depends on (bx, bz), we could move this minimisation directly into the constraints and write
inf
bx,bz
b2x+b
2
z=1
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
(35)
=
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: ∃(bx, bz) ∈ K : 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
(36)
=
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: sup
(bx,bz)∈K
〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ ≥ S.
(37)
Clearly, the above problem is no longer a convex optimisation problem but there exists a convex relaxation by replacing K
with any convex set P ⊇ K. We will replace K by a compact convex polytope P with finite set of vertices (plx, plz). Since
the individual constraints in (35) are linear in bx, bz, it suffices to only consider points on these vertices. As such, we can
efficiently lower bound (35) via
(35) ≥
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: sup
(bx,bz)∈P
〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ ≥ S
≥
inf l infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + plx〈Fx〉ρ + plz〈Fz〉ρ ≥ S
(38)
The above structure can now be incorporated in a simple algorithm (illustrated in Fig. 2) that computes the optimisation
of Bob’s measurements via a sequence of lower bounds (also see [12, 13] where a similar method was used for 3-dimensional
problems). The algorithm is given by:
(i) Start by initiating P as a rectangle that contains K.
(ii) Use (32) to compute the value of (38) for every vertices (p1x, p1z) . . . (pnx , pnz ) of P.
(iii) Pick the first vertex bmin that attains the minimum in (38) and refine P by introducing a new edge to P that is
tangential to K. This will “cut off” bmin and create two new vertices (see Fig.2). Proceed to (ii).
Repeating (ii) and (iii) will give a progressive refinement of P that approaches the boundary of K from the outside at
the vicinity of those points (bx, bz) that realise the minimum of (29). It turns out that, this algorithm only requires a few
iterations to achieve a very high precision for our above-mentioned problem.
F. Optimisation of Alice’s angle: an ε-net for ϕ
For the representation given by equation (14), Alice’s measurement on her qubit is fully described by the angle ϕ, which
could take values in the interval [0, pi/2]. Consequently, the minimisation over Alice’s measurement angle (cyan box in
(29)) is not a SDP.
In this subsection, we will show how one could obtain a bound on the minimisation over Alice’s measurement angle by
employing an ε-net. The basic idea of the ε-net is as follows: we split the interval [0, pi/2] into smaller segments of size 2ε0
each centred around a raster-point ϕi. We then evaluate (29) (i.e. everything in the magenta box) on each raster-point
and subtract a pessimistic error ∆(ε0, ϕ) , which bounds how much would the value of (29) have changed when evaluated
on any other ϕ within the segment. Taking the minimal value over all segments will then give us a lower bound on the
whole optimisation (29)(cyan box).
Refining those segments into even smaller ones will give tighter lower bounds. In order to keep the total computational
cost low, we successively refine only the segment that gives the minimum value for a given round of the procedure. By doing
so, we arrive in a situation (see Fig.3) where we only have to improve our refinement around a single point corresponding
to the global minimum, i.e. the single ϕ that achieves C∗C4×4(S).
In order to bound the error of each segment, we will need to investigate the relation between the entire optimisation
and Alice’s measurement angle ϕ. Varying ϕ (see (14)) will affect the two inner optimisations of (29) in two ways: On
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Fig. 2. Minimising ω: Iterative refinement
of P (magenta vertices, black edges) to iden-
tify the optimal ω in K (cyan semicircle). The
parameters considered in the diagram is given
by λ = 0.2, S = 2.4 and ϕ = 1.2. In every iter-
ation of our algorithm, we identify bmin (grey
circles), the vertex of P that gives the mini-
mum value of optimisation (38), and remove
it by introducing a new edge. In this example,
six iterations are sufficient to achieve a target
precision of 10−5.
one hand, since the objective function depends on ϕ via the T1(ρ), it will change with varying ϕ. On the other hand, the
feasible set of possible ρAB will change with varying ϕ since the CHSH operator, i.e. F0, Fx and Fz, depends on ϕ as well.
We will now address the dependence of the CHSH operator on ϕ. Without loss of generality we could have reformulated
(29) by considering all states that could achieve a Bell violation greater than or equals the observed CHSH value S as it
is a valid relaxation of the optimisation problem. This implies that for fixed ϕ we could also perform our optimisation
over the set
SSϕ := {ρ|〈CHSH|ϕ〉ρ ≥ S} . (39)
When we change ϕ to ϕ+ ε, on a segment specified by |ε| ≤ ε0, we have to consider a different set of states Ssϕ+ε. Hence,
the optimal solution on the whole segment around ϕ will be attained on a state from the set
SSε0ϕ :=
⋃
|ε|≤ε0
SSϕ+ε (40)
We consider the norm of the difference of the two CHSH operators and we have:
‖CHSH|ϕ − CHSH|ϕ−ε‖∞
= ‖(F0 + bxFx + bzFz)|ϕ − (F0 + bxFx + bzFz)|ϕ−ε‖∞
= 2‖(Q(ϕ)−Q(ϕ− ε))⊗ (CB2 + CB3)‖∞
≤ 4‖Q(ϕ)−Q(ϕ− ε)‖∞
≤ 4 max
ϕ,|ε|≤ε0
‖Q(ϕ)−Q(ϕ− ε)‖∞ (41)
= 4 max
ϕ,|ε|≤ε0
∥∥∥∥( cos(ϕ2 )2 − cos(ϕ−ε2 )2 cos(ϕ2 ) sin(ϕ2 )− cos(ϕ−ε2 ) sin(ϕ−ε2 )cos(ϕ2 ) sin(ϕ2 )− cos(ϕ−ε2 ) sin(ϕ−ε2 ) sin(ϕ2 )2 − sin(ϕ−ε2 )2
)∥∥∥∥
∞
(42)
= 4 max
|ε|≤ε0
√
1
2
− 1
2
cos(ε) (43)
≤ 2ε0, (44)
where we assumed that b2x + b2z = 1 holds up to a negligible deviation (otherwise, adding a further factor ≈ 1 +  will be
required). From the above relation, we conclude that every state ρ that could attain a CHSH value S for measurements
with the measurement angle ϕ + ε will attain a CHSH value of at least S − 2ε0 with the measurements angle ϕ. Hence,
we have the inclusion relation:
SSε0ϕ ⊆ SS−2ε0ϕ . (45)
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Fig. 3. Adaptive refinement of the ε-net Lower bounds on H(Z|Eθ), by evaluating (28) on segments. (For comparison) The
magenta coloured points give the exact value of (29) for a raster of different ϕ. (The actual bound) The cyan coloured line gives a
pessimistic lower bound (not assuming continuity) valid for a segment of length ε0 centred around a specific ϕ. Fixing the width
of a segment, ε0, to be fine enough will give a tighter lower bound. In order to perform the computation efficiently, we start with
a rough raster with a large segment size. We then identify and refine the segment with the lowest estimate on the target function
H(Z|Eθ) and we repeat this procedure.
which means that we can perform optimisation (29) by replacing S with S − 2ε0 on each segment of size 2ε0 (see Fig. 4)
to obtain a reliable lower bound.
Fig. 4. Feasible sets: The optimisation for
a fixed ϕ runs over a set SSϕ , i.e. all states
with CHSH values larger than or equals to S.
Varying ϕ by not more than ε0 will not change
the CHSH value by more than 2ε0. Therefore,
the set SS−2ε0ϕ includes all states that can at-
tain CHSH value larger than or equals to S for
some angle in the interval (ϕ− ε0, ϕ+ ε0).
We are now left with assessing the change in the objective of (29) introduced by varying varphi, i.e. the error of the
functional. Using Hölder’s inequality, we can dualise the trace norm of an operator X as
‖X‖1 = sup
Y :‖Y ‖∞=1
tr(Y X) (46)
and for suitably chosen M ,N with ‖M‖∞ = ‖N‖∞ = 1, we can rewrite the objective of (29) as
fM,N (ϕ, ρ) := 〈λ{M,Q(0)} − λQ(0)MQ(0) + (1− λ){N,Q(ϕ)} − (1− λ)Q(ϕ)NQ(ϕ)〉ρ (47)
9
Here, we could bound the following expression by:
|fM,N (ϕ, ρ)− fM,N (ϕ+ ε, ρ)|
≤ (1− λ) sup
N,ϕ,ε
∥∥∥{N,Q(ϕ)} −Q(ϕ)NQ(ϕ)− {N,Q(ϕ+ ε)}+Q(ϕ+ ε)NQ(ϕ+ ε)∥∥∥
∞
≤ (1− λ)4ε0 (48)
which follows after a short computation from the central estimate ‖(Q(ϕ) − Q(ϕ + ε))‖∞ ≤ ε0/2, which was already
computed in (44).
Thus, by combining (44) and (48), we can estimate the maximal error on a segment around some fixed ϕ. Applying
this estimate and the technique described above to (29), finally gives
C∗C4×4(S) = inf
ϕ∈[0,pi/2]
inf
(bx,bz)
b2x+b
2
z=1
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S
≥ inf
ϕk∈I
inf
l
infρ λ ‖ρ− T0[ρ]‖1 + (1− λ) ‖ρ− T1[ρ]‖1 − 2(1− λ)εk0
s.th.: 〈F0〉ρ + bx〈Fx〉ρ + bz〈Fz〉ρ = S − 2εk0
(49)
where εk0 denotes the according segment width and ϕk ∈ I denote the angles which form the raster as described above
and in Fig. 3.
G. Worst case convex hull over two-qubit strategies:
By employing the techniques described in the previous subsections, we are able to compute the two-qubit function
C∗C4×4(S) point-wise up to arbitrary precision. The only remaining step for computing the desired bound C
∗(S) is to
estimate (22). We will tackle this problem by defining a convex function C(S) that is smaller or equals to C∗C4×4(S) for
all S ∈ (2, 2√2), (see Fig. 5). Given such a function C(S), we can conclude that
C∗(S) = inf
µ:〈S′〉µ=S
∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)C∗C4×4(S
′)
≥ inf
µ:〈S′〉µ=S
∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)C(S′)
= inf
µ:〈S′〉µ=S
C
(∫ 2√2
S′=2
µ(dS′)S′
)
= C(S). (50)
At this point, we note that the analytical result of [4], which is a special case of our computation for λ = 1, shows that
C∗C4×4(S) is convex. This means that we can set C(S) = C
∗
C4×4(S) in the case of λ = 1. The numerical evaluation of
C∗C4×4(S) suggest the same conclusion might actually hold for all λ ∈ (0, 1). However, we could not prove this analytically
and therefore, the following steps is necessary.
Fig. 5. Convex bound: given the value of C∗C4×4(S) for a raster of
values · · · ≤ Si ≤ Si+1 ≤ . . . (magenta points) allows us to estimate
C∗C4×4(S) from below by taking the floor on every interval (dot-dashed
black line). The extreme points of this graph are a subset of the points
marked by cyan squares. From this we can easily compute the lower
convex estimate C(S) (cyan line).
It is straight forward to see from the definition of (25) that C∗C4×4(S) is a monotonous non-decreasing function, i.e.
we have C∗C4×4(S1) ≤ C∗C4×4(S2) for S1 ≤ S2, since increasing S will impose more restrictions on Eve leaving her with a
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smaller set of possible attacks. The evaluation of C∗C4×4(S) for a raster of values S0 = 2 ≤ S1 ≤ S2 ≤ · · · ≤ SN = 2
√
2
will therefore enable us to estimate C∗C4×4(S) from below for all values of S by taking the floor
bC∗C4×4(S)c := C∗C4×4(Si) ∀S ∈ [Si, Si+1) (51)
on every interval [Si, Si+1). Since this function is now defined on every S and is never larger than C∗C4×4(S) itself,
computing its lower convex hull by applying a Legendre transformation twice will give us a valid convex estimate C(S)
(see Fig. 5).
H. A conjectured alternative proof
We observed from some numerical exploration that the states saturating optimisation (7) for λ = 1/2 appear to have
the following two properties:
1. The reduced state on AB is Bell-diagonal with only two nonzero eigenvalues.
2. The states satisfy Pg(A0|E) = Pg(A1|E), where Pg(AX |E) is Eve’s maximum probability of guessing the outcome
of measurement AX .
Letting ρE|AX denote Eve’s state conditioned on the outcomeAX , the first property would imply F (ρE|AX=0, ρE|AX=1)
2 =
1 − d(ρE|AX=0, ρE|AX=1)2, where F is the root-fidelity and d is the trace distance. (This is because Eve’s states would
then be supported on a common qubit subspace, and this equality holds for qubit states when the states have the same
eigenvalues [14], which is indeed the case here [4].) Using the fact that we can assume AX to be uniform without loss of
generality, it would then follow from the bound in [15] and the relation d(ρE|AX=0, ρE|AX=1) = 2Pg(AX |E)− 1 that
H(AX |E) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1− F (ρE|AX=0, ρE|AX=1)
2
)
= log(2)− h2
(
1−√4Pg(AX |E)(1− Pg(AX |E))
2
)
. (52)
Applying the second property would then imply1
1
2
H(A0|E) + 1
2
H(A1|E) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1−√4Pg(AX |E)(1− Pg(AX |E))
2
)
for either X
= log(2)− h2
(
1−
√
4P avgg (1− P avgg )
2
)
, where P avgg =
1
2
Pg(A0|E) + 1
2
Pg(A1|E). (53)
The key point of this reduction is that the maximum value of P avgg (subject to a constraint on the CHSH value) can be
bounded by SDP methods [16–18]. We computed the corresponding bounds, and found that they matched closely with
the results obtained above. Hence if it could be proven that the two properties listed above indeed hold for the states
saturating the optimisation in (7), this would provide an alternative approach to deriving our results. The benefit of such
an approach is that it would be substantially faster, as it does not rely on computing an ε-net of points.
We remark that for the case λ = 1 (i.e. simply bounding the H(A0|E) term alone), we can prove that the first property
holds, and thus Eq. (52) must hold in that scenario. In that case, we find that substituting the known closed-form bound
on Pg(A0|E) in terms of the CHSH value [19] yields exactly the closed-form bound on H(A0|E) derived in Ref. [4]. This
can be viewed as an alternative method to derive the latter bound, and it may be of interest to study how this approach
could be generalised.
I. Approaches without the qubit reduction
Our analysis thus far relied on reducing the analysis to a qubit scenario. In principle, however, there are some approaches
which could be used to tackle the optimisation (7) without this reduction, and we shall now briefly outline these possibilities.
These approaches could potentially allow for more general applicability of our methods.
1 If the bound (52) were convex with respect to Pg(AX |E), the second property would not be required; unfortunately, the bound is instead
concave, so instead this approach only yields the desired final result if and only if the second property holds.
11
The first approach consists of noting that the trace norm terms in the optimisation (29) can be rewritten using
‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1 = sup−1≤M≤1 tr(M(ρ− T [ρ])) = supP
1
‖P‖∞
tr(P (ρ− T [ρ])) = sup
P
1
‖P‖∞
tr((P − T [P ])ρ), (54)
where supP is taken over all Hermitian P , and for the last equality we used the fact that pinching channels are self-adjoint.
Therefore, any choice of P yields a valid lower bound. In particular, if we choose P to be a (noncommutative) polynomial
function of the measurement operators, then lower-bounding tr((P − T [P ])ρ) is precisely a noncommutative polynomial
optimisation of the type studied in [18], which can be solved by SDP methods without reducing the analysis to qubits.
An advantage of this approach is that we can impose the full output statistics as constraints (similar to [1, 16, 17])
instead of just the CHSH value alone. As for the ‖P‖∞ term, it can be upper-bounded separately by noting that‖P‖∞ = supσ | tr(Pσ)| ≤ max{supσ tr(Pσ), supσ tr(−Pσ)}, where supσ is taken over all normalised density operators σ.
This is also of the right form to be bounded using the SDP method described in [18]. If P is chosen to be a polynomial
of low degree, the corresponding SDPs are quite tractable and can be solved quickly (in particular, they are substantially
simpler than the ones described in [1]).
Unfortunately, when we applied this method to the CHSH scenario, we were unable to find a choice of P that was
sufficiently robust to noise for practical purposes. While we did find that it can yield a tight bound at maximum CHSH
value, the bound quickly drops to zero once noise is added. It is not currently clear whether this is an inherent limitation
of this approach, or whether some better choice of P might overcome this difficulty. (A possible cause of this suboptimality
could be the fact that since the optimisations for tr((P −T [P ])ρ) and ‖P‖∞ were solved separately, this “decouples” them
from each other, resulting in worse bounds than would be obtained from tackling (54) directly. The choice of P that
certifies a tight bound at maximum CHSH violation was obtained by exploiting the fact that the states and measurements
which attain maximum CHSH value are essentially unique, up to trivial local operations. Therefore, we were able to find
an explicit operator P that saturates the variational characterisation in Eq. (54) and write it as a polynomial of those
measurement operators. However, some care was still needed to choose the polynomial such that the bound on ‖P‖∞ is
tight.)
A second approach is based on the method developed in [1]. To briefly summarise, the method described in that work
essentially yields some possible choices of vector ~µ and operator polynomials K0,K1 such that
H(AX |E) ≥ ~µ · ~γ − log〈KX〉, (55)
where ~γ is the list of all statistics estimated in the experiment (which could be, for instance, just the CHSH value alone
but could also be all output statistics instead). We now note that for any α > 0, we have log x ≤ x/α+ logα− 1 (this is
simply the tangent line to log x at the point x = α). Therefore, for any α0, α1 we would have
λH(A0|E) + (1− λ)H(A1|E) ≥ λ(~µ · ~γ − log〈K0〉) + (1− λ)(~µ · ~γ − log〈K1〉) (56)
≥ ~µ · ~γ −
〈
λ
α0
K0 +
1− λ
α1
K1
〉
− λ logα0 − (1− λ) logα1 + 1. (57)
In this final expression, 〈(λ/α0)K0 + ((1− λ)/α1)K1〉 is again an operator polynomial of a form which can be bounded
using the SDPs in [18] without requiring the qubit reduction. By optimising over choices of the two tangent points αX (as
well as the vector ~µ and operator polynomials KX), we were able to compute some bounds on the main optimisation (7),
imposing constraints based on the full output statistics. However, we found that while the resulting bounds are indeed
better than the bounds on H(A0|E) alone, the improvement was fairly small (in particular, the resulting curves were
worse than those shown in the main text). Hence we were also unable to use this approach to obtain tight bounds in this
situation, though in contrast to the first approach above, it performs well at moderate noise values rather than low noise
values. Again, it is not currently clear whether it might be possible to improve on this finding with a better choice of the
variational parameters αX , ~µ,KX . (In fact, the parameter ~µ could also be optimised separately for each term H(AX |E),
but this is computationally expensive.)
II. SIMULATION WITH ALL-PHOTONIC SETUP
In this section, we present the simulated asymptotic key rate that one could achieve in an all-photonic experiment.
For all-photonic implementations the noise model presented in Ref. [20] gives a more realistic description than the white
noise considered in the main text. In this model, the source is modelled by a pair of two-mode squeeze vacua (TMSV)
over polarisation modes with mean photon number λ1 and λ2. Alice and Bob will then set the measurement angles to
be θAX and θBY where X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} are their corresponding inputs. Both Alice and Bob will have
a pair of single-photon detectors, each with some imperfect quantum efficiency. We let the effective detection efficiency
(the total transmittivity between the source and each detector) be η. Furthermore, we assume that Alice and Bob will
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give deterministic outputs whenever they observe no detection events. Finally, we also assume that the detectors have
negligible dark count rates.
Fig. 6. Asymptotic key rate for all-
photonic experiments. For this sim-
ulation, we use the model presented in
Ref. [20] and set the dark count rate of
the detectors to zero. We also assumed
that Alice and Bob assign determinis-
tic outputs whenever their detectors do
not click. We plot the lower bound on
the key rate as a function of detection
efficiency η. From the plot, we can see
that randomised key basis can improve
the achievable key rate in the lower de-
tection efficiency regime.
The corresponding key rate is presented in Fig. 6. To obtain these curves, we optimise the achievable key rates by
varying the mean photon number of the TMSV λ1 and λ2 as well as the measurement angles of Alice and Bob θAX θBY for
each value of η. Unfortunately, the improvement from employing the randomised key basis protocol is rather limited for
the all-photonic experiments. Remarkably, the required detection efficiency to achieve non-zero key rate remains extremely
demanding.
III. ADDITIONAL LEMMAS AND THEOREMS
Theorem 1 DI-Binary Pinsker++: (The following Thm. is a special case of Thm.1 in [10]) Let Q be a (not necessarily
rank one) projector on a finite dimensional Hilbert space of dimension d and let T be the pinching channel constructed
from Q via
T [ρ] = QρQ+ (1−Q)ρ(1−Q) = ρ+ 2QρQ− {Q, ρ}. (58)
For any state ρ, the following inequality holds:
D(ρ‖T [ρ]) ≥ log(2)− h2
(
1− ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1
2
)
. (59)
For the proof of Thm. 1, we will require the following Lemmas:
Lemma 1 Gibbs variational principle for operators: Let L be a self-adjoint operator. For any quantum state ρ, the
following holds:
− tr (ρL) ≥ H(ρ)− log tr (eL) . (60)
Proof. Consider the thermal state σ = e
L
tr(eL)
.
− tr(ρL) = − tr (ρ log eL) (61)
= − tr
(
ρ
(
log
eL
tr (eL)
+ log tr
(
eL
)))
(62)
= − tr
(
ρ log
eL
tr (eL)
)
− tr (ρ log tr (eL)) (63)
= − tr (ρ log σ)− log tr (eL) (64)
≥ − tr (ρ log ρ)− log tr (eL) (65)
= H(ρ)− log tr (eL) , (66)
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where we have used the positivity of the quantum relative entropy D (ρ||σ) = tr (ρ log ρ− ρ log σ).
Lemma 2 : For a quantum state χ and an operator A with spectral radius rspec(A) ≤ s, the following relation holds:
tr
(
χeA
) ≤ cosh(s) + 1
s
sinh(s) tr(χA). (67)
Proof. Firstly, we will find an upper bound to the exponential function in a fixed interval [−s, s]. The simplest ansatz is
to upper bound it with a linear function, which can be parameterise with α and β such that ex ≤ α+ βx. Such an upper
bound can be determined by demanding that the points of the exponential function at the boundaries of the interval
intersects with the linear function, i.e.
α± βs = e±s, (68)
which yields α = cosh(s), β = 1s sinh(s). Hence, we obtain
tr
(
χeA
) ≤ tr(χ [cosh(s) + 1
s
sinh(s)A
])
(69)
= cosh(s) +
1
s
sinh(s) tr (χA) . (70)
Lemma 3 : For any projector Q and quantum state ρ, we have
‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1 ≤ 1 (71)
Proof. We use equation (46) and projectors P and M = 2P − 1 to rewrite
sup
ρQ
‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1 = 2 sup
ρP Q
tr (P (ρ− T [ρ]))
= 2 sup
ρP Q
〈{P,Q} − 2QPQ〉ρ
= 2 sup
P Q
‖{P,Q} − 2QPQ‖∞ (72)
Using the usual block decomposition of the algebra generated by two projectors (P and Q) we can conclude that the
optimal solution of the above will be attained on 2× 2 matrices. We can assume without loss of generality that
P =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and Q =
(
cos(φ)2 cos(φ) sin(φ)
cos(φ) sin(φ) sin(φ)2
)
. (73)
Thus, we have
sup
φ
∥∥∥∥∥
{(
1 0
0 0
)
,
(
cos(φ)2 cos(φ) sin(φ)
cos(φ) sin(φ) sin(φ)2
)}
− 2
(
cos(φ)2 cos(φ) sin(φ)
cos(φ) sin(φ) sin(φ)2
)(
1 0
0 0
)(
cos(φ)2 cos(φ) sin(φ)
cos(φ) sin(φ) sin(φ)2
)∥∥∥∥∥
∞
=
1
2
. (74)
Proof of Pinsker++. The basic idea of this proof is to find a lower bound on D(ρ‖T [ρ]) in terms of ‖ρ−T [ρ]‖1 by bounding
the expression
inf
ρ
D(ρ‖T [ρ])− λ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1 ≥ cλ (75)
from below by some cλ that only depends on a variational parameter λ ∈ R+ but not on ρ. Given such a cλ for all λ will
then allow us to obtain a bound on D via an inverse Legendre transformation
∀ρ : D(ρ‖T [ρ]) ≥ sup
λ∈R+
cλ + λ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1 := f(‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1) (76)
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Rewriting (75) with equation (46), M = 2P − 1 and Lem. 1 for L = log(T [ρ]) + 2λ(P − T [P ]) yields the following
inequality:
D (ρ||T [ρ])− λ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1
≥ inf
ρ
inf
0≤P≤I
− tr (ρ(log(T [ρ]) +2λ(P − T [P ])))−H(ρ)
≥ inf
ρ
inf
0≤P≤I
− log tr
(
elog(T [ρ])+2λ(P−T [P ])
)
≥ − log sup
ρ
sup
0≤P≤I
tr
(
elog(T [ρ])+2λ(P−T [P ])
)
≥ − log sup
ρ
sup
0≤P≤I
tr
(
elog(T [ρ])e2λ(P−T [P ])
)
= − log sup
ρ
sup
0≤P≤I
tr
(
T [ρ] e2λ(P−T [P ])
)
, (77)
where we have applied the Golden-Thompson inequality tr(eA+B) ≤ tr(eAeB). Next, we use Lem. 2 with χ = T [ρ],
A = 2λ(P − T [P ]), which implies s = λ (see Lem. 3). This yields
Eq. (77) ≥ − log
(
cosh(s) + sup
ρ
sup
0≤P≤I
2λ
s
sinh(s) tr (T [ρ] (P − T [P ]))
)
= − log (cosh(λ))
(78)
Hence, we know that
D (ρ||T [ρ]) ≥ − log (cosh(λ)) + λ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1. (79)
Since this is true for all λ ≥ 0, the optimal bound can be found by maximizing the right hand side over λ ≥ 0, which gives
λmax = arccoth
(
1
‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1
)
. (80)
Inserting it back into (79), where we use the notation x = ‖ρ− T [ρ]‖1, yields
D (ρ||T [ρ]) ≥ − log
(
cosh
(
arccoth
(
1
x
)))
+ x arccoth
(
1
x
)
(81)
=
1
2
(
log
(
1− x2)+ x log(1 + x
1− x
))
(82)
=
1
2
(log(1 + x) + log(1− x) + x log(1 + x)− x log(1− x)) (83)
=
1 + x
2
log(1 + x) +
1− x
2
log(1− x) (84)
= log(2) +
1 + x
2
log
(
1 + x
2
)
+
1− x
2
log
(
1− x
2
)
(85)
= log(2)− h2
(
1− x
2
)
, (86)
which concludes the proof.
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